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Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa – Part 1: Africa’s Response 
to the OECD BEPS Action Plan1 
 
Annet Wanyana Oguttu 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper considers what Africa’s response should be to the OECD’s base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) project. The paper acknowledges that BEPS concerns for developing 
countries (such as those in Africa) may not necessarily be the same as those for developed 
countries. The author first explains the concepts of tax avoidance and tax planning, to 
describe the background to BEPS. An explanation is given of the causes of BEPS, the 
challenges BEPS poses to corporate tax systems, the importance of corporate taxes in 
Africa, and the factors that exacerbate BEPS in Africa. The paper also differentiates BEPS 
from the notion of illicit financial flows – a matter that is causing a lot of confusion to the 
general public in understanding BEPS issues, and to finding solutions to the problem of 
capital flight from Africa. Thereafter the author addresses the relevance of the OECD BEPS 
Project to Africa, the international initiatives that could benefit Africa in curtailing BEPS, and 
what Africa’s response should be. 
 
Keywords: base erosion and profit shifting; double non-taxation; domestic revenue 
mobilisation; harmful tax practices; illicit financial flows; international tax cooperation; tax 
avoidance; tax havens; tax morality; tax planning; tax treaties. 
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1  The gist of this paper was presented by the author at the inaugural IBFD Africa Tax Symposium on the theme ‘Tax 
Trends in International Taxation an African Perspective’, 18-19 June 2015, Livingstone, Zambia. 
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Introduction 
 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), which make use of gaps in the interaction of different tax systems to artificially 
reduce taxable income or to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions in which little or no economic 
activity is performed (OECD 2013a). Curtailing BEPS and preserving countries’ tax bases 
has been a concern of the international community and national governments for decades. 
Over the last few years, budgetary deficits resulting from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis 
brought international concern about curtailing BEPS to the forefront (McKibbin 2010; Shah 
2010), prompting the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 
issue a report in 2013 in which it noted that ‘BEPS constitutes a serious risk to tax revenues, 
tax sovereignty and tax fairness for OECD member countries and non-members alike’ 
(OECD 2013a: 5). The OECD notes that what is at stake is the international corporate tax 
system. Consequently it came up with a 15-point BEPS Action Plan, which is intended to 
ensure that profits are taxed where the economic activities generating those profits are 
performed, and where value is created.2  
 
This paper acknowledges that developing countries (such as those in Africa) may not 
necessarily have the same concerns about BEPS as developed countries. Part 1 of the 
paper (this part) addresses what Africa’s response should be to the OECD BEPS Action 
Plan; Part 2 (forthcoming) will provide a critical analysis of the BEPS Action Plan from an 
African perspective. In Part 1, the author first explains the concepts of tax avoidance and tax 
planning with reference to international case law, which is of persuasive value in most 
African countries or forms part of the common law of such countries. An explanation is then 
given of the causes of BEPS, the challenges BEPS poses to corporate tax systems, the 
importance of corporate taxes in Africa, as well as the factors that exacerbate BEPS in 
Africa. Thereafter an explanation is given of the difference between BEPS and illicit financial 
flows – a matter that is causing a lot of confusion to the general public in understanding 
BEPS issues and finding solutions to the problem of capital flight from Africa. Based on this 
background, the author addresses the relevance of the OECD BEPS Action Plan for Africa, 
and what Africa’s response should be. 
 
 
1  Understanding the concepts of tax 
avoidance, tax planning and tax mitigation 
  
To understand why countries have to curtail BEPS, it is first important to explain the freedom 
that taxpayers have to avoid taxes legally. Tax avoidance can be prevented through anti-tax-
avoidance provisions in domestic tax laws, double-tax treaties, and through countries 
adhering to international initiatives and recommendations against tax avoidance, such as 
those in the OECD 15-point BEPS Action Plan. 
                                                          
2  The OECD’s 15-point Action Plan (discussed in detail in Part 2 of this paper from the perspective of African countries) is 
as follows: Action Plan 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy; Action Plan 2: Neutralise the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements; Action Plan 3: Strengthen Controlled Foreign Companies Rules; Action Plan 4: Limit 
Base Erosion via Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments; Action Plan 5: Counter Harmful Tax Practices 
More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance; Action Plan 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse; Action Plan 
7: Prevent the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status; Action Plan 8: Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line With 
Value Creation with respect to Intangibles; Action Plan 9: Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line With Value 
Creation with respect to Risks and Capital; Action Plan 10: Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line With 
Value Creation with respect to Other High-Risk Transactions; Action Plan 11: Establish Methodologies to Collect and 
Analyse Data on BEPS and the Actions to Address It; Action Plan 12: Require Taxpayers to Disclose Their Aggressive 
Tax Planning Arrangements; Action Plan 13: Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation; Action Plan 14: Make 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective; Action Plan 15: Develop a Multilateral Instrument. 
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Tax avoidance has to be distinguished from tax evasion, which is illegal and entails non-
compliance with the tax laws. Tax evasion includes activities (like the falsification of tax 
returns and books of account) that are deliberately undertaken by a taxpayer to illegally free 
himself from the tax that the law charges upon his income. Tax authorities normally resort to 
criminal prosecution to prevent tax evasion (Meyerowitz 2009; OECD 1987). Tax avoidance 
involves using legal methods to arrange one’s affairs, so as to pay less tax. This is done by 
utilising loopholes in tax laws and exploiting them within legal parameters (Meyerowitz 2009; 
Olivier 1997; Rapakko 1989). Since tax avoidance is legal, it can only be prevented if the 
legislature amends the law and prohibits the practice in question. It is in this regard that the 
courts have historically held the view that no legal obligation rests upon a taxpayer to pay 
higher taxes than he is legally bound to under the taxing Act, and that a taxpayer is not 
prevented from entering into a genuine, or bona fide, transaction which, when carried out, has 
the effect of avoiding or reducing liability to tax. As early as 1928, the UK court (whose 
decisions are of persuasive value in most countries previously colonised by the UK) held in 
the case of Levene v IRC,3 that: 
 
It is trite law that His Majesty’s subjects are free, if they can, to make their own 
arrangements so that their cases may fall outside the scope of the taxing Acts. They 
incur no legal penalties, and, strictly speaking, no moral censure if, having considered 
the lines drawn by the legislature for the imposition of taxes, they make it their business 
to walk outside them.  
 
Such arrangements by taxpayers to reduce their tax liability are normally referred to as tax 
planning or tax mitigation. In CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd, it was explained that ‘Income 
tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or incurs expenditure in 
circumstances which reduce his assessable income or entitle him to reduction in his tax 
liability’.4 In CIR v Willoughby, the court held that the hallmark of tax mitigation is that the 
taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally-attractive option afforded to him by the tax legislation, 
and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that parliament intended to be suffered by 
those taking advantage of the option.5  
 
Tax avoidance and tax morality 
 
Historically, the courts have held that there is no morality regarding paying taxes. This was 
confirmed by Lord President Clyde in the UK case of Ayrshire Pullman Motors Services and 
D M Ritchie v IRC,6 where it was held that: 
 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or otherwise, to arrange 
his legal relations to his business or to his property so as to enable the Inland Revenue 
to put the largest possible shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow – and 
quite rightly – to take advantage, which is open to it under the taxing Statutes for the 
purpose of depleting the taxpayer’s pocket. The taxpayer is in the like manner, entitled 
to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the 
Revenue.  
 
This was confirmed by Lord Tomlin in the celebrated case of ICR v Duke of Westminster,7 
where it was held that: 
 
                                                          
3 [1928] AC 21. 
4  [1987] AC 155. 
5  [1997] 4 All ER 65 at 73. 
6 Ayrshire Pullman Motors Services and DM Ritchie v IRC 14 TC 754.  
7 ICR v Duke of Westminster 51 TIR 467. 
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Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so 
as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to 
pay an increased tax.  
 
Even though tax avoidance is not illegal, over the years it has been frowned on by the courts 
and tax authorities as the resultant loss of tax revenue has the effect of limiting any 
government’s ability to pursue its economic and social objectives (Brooks and Head 1997). 
Indeed, the morality of tax avoidance was questioned years back in cases such as Re 
Weston’s Settlements, in which Lord Denning made a characteristically terse admonition that 
‘the avoidance of tax may be lawful, but it is not yet a virtue’.8 In CIR v McGuckian, Lord 
Steyn remarked that the Duke of Westminster notion that a taxpayer is free to arrange his 
financial affairs as he thinks fit, had ‘ceased to be canonical’ as to the consequences of a tax 
avoidance scheme.9 In the New Zealand case of Elmiger v CIR it was held that the: 
 
Ingenious legal devices contrived to enable individual taxpayers to minimise or avoid 
their tax liabilities are often not merely sterile or unproductive in themselves (except 
perhaps in respect of their tax advantages for the taxpayer concerned), but that they 
have social consequences which are contrary to the general public interest.10  
 
The House of Lords itself recognised the limits of the decision in the Duke of Westminster 
case. In IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd, Lord Tomlin pronounced that the Duke of Westminster 
case ‘tells us little or nothing as to what methods of ordering one’s affairs will be recognised 
by the courts as effective to lessen the tax that would otherwise attach to them if business 
transactions were conducted in a straight-forward way’.11 Consequently, over the years some 
countries have tried to make a distinction between proper tax planning, which is concerned 
with the organisation of a taxpayer’s affairs so that they give rise to the minimum tax liability 
within the law, and those instances where taxpayers resort to artificial arrangements that 
have little or no actual economic impact upon the taxpayer, and are just designed to 
manipulate tax laws in order to achieve results that conflict with or defeat the intention of 
parliament. In Australia, for instance, the 1999 Report on Business Taxation, refers to a form 
of tax avoidance that is essentially a misuse or abuse of the law, and is driven by the 
exploitation of structural loopholes in the law to achieve tax outcomes that were not intended 
by parliament. It includes the manipulation of the law, and a focus on form and legal effect 
rather than substance (Australian Government 1999). In South Africa, the notion of 
‘impermissible tax avoidance’ is used to refer to certain tax avoidance practices that extend 
beyond what is legally acceptable,12 and often involves taxpayers concealing their assets 
and income – keeping them outside their domestic tax jurisdiction, in low-tax and tax-haven 
jurisdictions.13 This concealment can take them over the dividing line between tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Re Weston’s Settlements [1968] All ER 338 at 342. 
9  [1997] 3 All ER 817 (HL). 
10  Elmiger v CIR [1966] NZLR 683 (SC) at 686.  
11  [1982] STC 30 (HL) at 32. 
12  Law Administration SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 
58 of 1962) (2005). See also the general anti-avoidance provisions in section 80A-L of South Africa’s Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962, as amended.  
13  The OECD defines a tax haven as a jurisdiction that actively makes itself available for the avoidance of tax that would 
have been paid in high-tax countries. See OECD (1987). 
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2  Overview of previous international 
measures to curtail BEPS  
 
To reduce their global tax exposure, MNEs have increasingly employed global tax avoidance 
strategies to maximise profits, and their links with any country with a favourable tax climate 
have become much stronger. In response countries have enacted anti-avoidance legislation, 
but taxpayers are usually a step ahead. The cycle of continuous amendments to cover 
loopholes in the legislation has made most countries’ corporate income tax provisions more 
complex, and yet this has not prevented well-advised taxpayers from aggressively avoiding 
domestic taxes by keeping their income in low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
For decades the OECD failed to acknowledge that its member counties had dealings with tax 
havens, and that they had lent credibility to many tax havens.14 OECD member countries 
also failed to acknowledge that they benefited from their involvement with tax havens 
(Stikeman 2002). As the growth of tax havens continued to be a major cause of the depletion 
of countries’ tax bases, from the early 1990s the international community began to take some 
measures to stifle their development. The European Union (EU), for instance, issued a report 
containing recommendations on company taxation in Europe that would prevent residents of 
member countries from transferring investments to other member countries that levied lower 
taxes. Since then the EU has issued various directives to prevent the depletion of its member 
countries’ tax bases (Kesti 2013). In 1997, the EU Council of Economic and Financial 
Ministers agreed on a package of measures to tackle harmful tax competition in order to help 
reduce distortions in the single market and to prevent excessive loss of tax revenue (Bennet 
2001). The measures included a Code of Conduct on business taxation.15 Subsequently a 
group of representatives of EU member states, called the Primarolo group, was set up to 
gather information on and assess any national tax measures that might fall foul of the Code 
(Terra and Wattel 2005: 284). In 1998 the Primarolo group came up with a report that 
blacklisted harmful national tax measures (Terra and Wattel 2005). 
 
In 1998 the OECD issued a Report on Harmful Tax Competition (OECD 1998), in which it 
pointed out that tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential tax regimes have harmful tax 
practices in place,16 which may lead to the depletion of other countries’ tax bases and distort 
financial and investment flows among countries.17 Further, these harmful tax practices 
undermine the integrity and fairness of tax systems; they discourage compliance by all 
taxpayers; cause undesirable shifts of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases such as 
labour, property and consumption; and they increase the administrative costs and 
compliance burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers (Roper and Ware 2001). In order to 
counter these harmful tax practices, the OECD recommended certain anti-avoidance 
measures that countries needed to adopt in order to enhance the effectiveness of their 
domestic legislation in curbing offshore tax avoidance (OECD 1998). The G8/G20 have, over 
the years, reinforced the initiatives of the EU and OECD in tackling harmful tax competition 
and obtaining information about transactions in tax havens and preferential tax regimes.18 
                                                          
14 Diamond and Diamond (2002) note that the UK has for years lent credibility to its overseas territories that have the status 
of British Crown dependencies. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office ‘Partnership for Progress and Prosperity - British 
and Overseas Territories’, available at 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1018028164839>, last 
accessed 18 May 2015. 
15  The Code of Conduct is a political commitment, not a legally enforceable rule. See Bratton and McCahery (2001). 
16  A harmful preferential tax regime can occur in both tax-haven and high-tax jurisdictions. Harmful tax regimes are 
characterised by having no or low effective tax rates on income, the regimes are ring-fenced, and there is a general lack 
of transparency and effective exchange of information with other countries. See OECD (1998). 
17 OECD (1998); Spitz and Clarke (2002). 
18  G8 Information Centre: The Birmingham Summit ‘G7 Initiative on Harmful Tax Competition’ (15-17 May 1988). Available 
at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998 birmingham/harmfultax.html>, last accessed 3 July 2015.  
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Despite the OECD’s 1998 report on harmful tax completion (Diamond and Diamond 2002), 
there was no political will among the governments of rich economies to deal with their own 
harmful tax practices and preferential tax regimes.19 Instead the OECD, under its Global 
Forum, placed emphasis on ensuring that tax havens implement its standards of 
transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, and that they exchange 
information about investments by other country residents in those jurisdictions (OECD 
2007a). 
 
 
3  The OECD BEPS project  
 
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, concerns about MNEs not paying 
their fair share of taxes were again brought to the forefront. This was engineered by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) like Christian Aid and the Tax Justice Network, which 
voiced public concern about companies paying little or no corporation tax in the countries in 
which they do business (Christian Aid 2008; Tax Justice Network n.d). As a result, at the 
2012 G20 summit in Mexico the national leaders explicitly referred to the need to prevent 
BEPS.20 21 At the behest of the G20, in February 2013 the OECD released its BEPS Report 
(OECD 2013a). Following the release of the BEPS report, there is now political will to 
address these concerns from governments and policymakers (Crivelli et al. 2015). 
 
BEPS is enabled by the fact that the current international corporate taxation framework has 
not kept pace with the changing business environment (Crivelli et al. 2015). Domestic rules 
for international taxation and internationally agreed standards are still grounded in an 
economic environment characterised by a lower degree of economic integration across 
borders – rather than today’s environment of global taxpayers, characterised by MNE 
companies that are placing importance on intellectual property as a value-driver, and the 
development of information and communication technologies. As businesses increasingly 
integrate across borders, the tax rules often remain uncoordinated: businesses come up with 
structures that are technically legal, but take advantage of asymmetries in domestic and 
international tax rules. The OECD notes that what is at stake is corporate income tax (OECD 
2013b). 
 
 
4  Are corporate taxes still relevant today?  
 
Since its inception over a century ago, corporate income tax has brought various advantages 
to countries’ tax systems. Corporate tax is an important backstop for personal income tax, 
and it can prevent excessive income shifting between labour income and capital income. 
Corporate taxes ensure tax on equity income earned by non-resident shareholders, which 
might otherwise escape taxation in the source country (OECD 2007b). Corporate taxes also 
                                                          
19  RS Avi-Yonah, ‘Prepared Testimony of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearing on Offshore Transactions’ (1 August 
2006). Available at 
<http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMAviYonahUafMI.pdf#search=%22Prepared%20testimony%20of20Avi-
Yonah%20before%20permanent%20subcommitte%20>, last accessed on 18 May 2015. 
20  The G20 (Group of twenty) is an international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 20 major 
economies. The members include the EU and 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The G20 was founded in 1999 with the aim of studying, reviewing and promoting high-
level discussion of policy issues pertaining to the promotion of international financial stability. For details see Wikipedia 
‘G20 Major Economies’; available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-20_major_economies>, accessed  8 May 2015. 
21  G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Los Cabos Mexico (2012). Available at 
<http://g20mexico.org/images/stories/temp/G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012.pdf>, accessed 3 August 2013. 
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provide a means of preventing the deferral of taxes by rich individuals who would be able to 
invest in foreign subsidiary companies and defer taxes indefinitely (until the corporation 
distributes dividends or when shares are sold) (Avi-Yonah 2015). Taxing corporate profits on 
an accrual basis, through the use of controlled foreign company legislation, ensures that 
individuals cannot use foreign subsidiaries as tax shelters. Corporate tax has also been used 
as an important vehicle to regulate corporate behaviour. It can be used as a disincentive for 
behaviour the legislator deems to be undesirable – for example, paying bribes or 
participating in boycotts; and it can be used as an incentive for desirable behaviour – for 
example, investment incentives, hiring incentives and clean energy incentives (Avi-Yonah 
2015). 
 
Despite the above some critics argue that corporate tax should be abolished, as it has 
become very complicated and ineffective due to tax avoidance strategies by MNEs 
encouraged by globalisation and technological advancements. The administrative costs of 
trying to make the corporate tax system work impose significant losses on the economies of 
many countries (Avi-Yonah 2015). It is thus contended that eliminating corporate taxes would 
not only reduce or eliminate the incentive to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions, but would 
also eliminate all the time, effort and money that companies spend on tax avoidance. This 
would level the playing field for smaller domestic businesses, which typically cannot afford to 
hire lawyers and accountants to devise the tax avoidance strategies that give MNEs a 
potential competitive advantage. It is also argued that corporate taxes amount to an 
additional tax on income, and that the incidence of tax is ultimately borne by individuals: 
although taxes may be levied on corporations, it is ordinary people that pay the tax. Thus 
levying corporate taxes amounts to double taxation: the tax on investment in corporate 
stocks would have been already taxed when earned by the individual, and again when it is 
paid out in dividends or sold for a capital gain (Avi-Yonah 2015). The relative importance of 
corporate tax in developed countries has also been questioned. Across the OECD, corporate 
income tax raises, on average, revenue equivalent to 3 per cent of GDP, or 10 per cent of 
total tax revenue (Avi-Yonah 2015). KPMG data reveals that, due to tax competition between 
countries, global corporate tax rates have generally declined between 2006 and 2013;22 this 
raises questions about the importance of corporate taxes in light of the challenges discussed 
above. 
 
4.1 The importance of corporate income taxes in Africa 
 
Despite the above arguments, in Africa the corporate tax system is a very important source 
of revenue that must be retained (Avi-Yonah 2015). While in OECD countries corporate tax is 
relatively not an important source of revenue, this is not true in developing countries – where 
it generally amounts to over 25 per cent of total revenue. The average for Africa is 29 per 
cent of total revenue (Avi-Yonah 2015). It should also be noted that, unlike the case of 
developed countries that can derive reasonable amounts of revenue from individual income 
taxes and consumption taxes, in many developing countries domestic economic activity 
occurs informally, with businesses maintaining few books and records, so the ability of 
governments to raise revenue from individuals and consumption taxes is limited. For these 
countries, taxing companies is crucial – otherwise they would have to rely entirely on the 
regressive Value Added Tax. In Africa, corporate tax from MNEs represents a major portion 
of the revenue tax base, since the domestic corporate tax base is often quite limited (Durst 
2014). For developing countries concern about double taxation caused by corporate taxes is 
not that serious, as some of the bearers of the tax burden (e.g. the providers of capital and 
consumers) are non-resident. It should also be noted that in many African countries most 
corporate tax is levied on corporate profits derived from rents for the exploitation of country-
specific resources, which makes it an efficient tax for a country to impose (Avi-Yonah 2015). 
                                                          
22  KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table, available at <http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-
resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx>, accessed 24 May 2015. 
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From the above it is clear that developing countries, such as those in Africa, have much 
more at stake in an effective international tax system because their development depends on 
it. This is confirmed by the 2015 IMF Spillovers Working Paper, which suggests that spillover 
effects on the tax base are substantially larger in developing than in advanced countries, 
which implies a likely loss of revenue from BEPS that is substantially larger for them (Crivelli 
et al. 2015). Spillover effects are essentially the impact of one country’s tax policy on the tax 
bases of other countries (this could be either through investments or shifting of profits) 
(Crivelli et al. 2015). For developing countries, even a single international tax case can 
involve very significant amounts of revenue (IMF 2014). These sums may be small relative to 
total tax revenue in sizeable advanced economies, but are large for the developing countries 
that are increasingly involved in such cases (IMF 2014). Thus the need for African countries 
to be associated with the OECD BEPS project, because it has the potential to put an end to 
tax avoidance by MNEs and so help to raise corporate tax revenue in African countries. 
 
4.2 The importance of corporate taxation for domestic resource mobilisation to 
ensure sustainable development in Africa 
  
At the UN Millennium Summit held on 6 September 2000 in New York, world leaders 
committed their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty by 2015. They 
agreed the Millennium Development Goals, which focus on mobilising resources to address 
the major gaps in human development.23 Building upon the Millennium Development Goals, 
at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro world leaders 
launched a set of Sustainable Development Goals that would promote sustained and 
inclusive economic growth. 24 25 
 
For decades, many African countries have relied on aid from foreign donors to build 
economic growth and fund government expenditure. Even though foreign aid has made a 
significant contribution to development, it is not sufficient for African countries to achieve 
sustainable equitable growth and poverty reduction. This is especially so now that many 
traditional donors from Europe and the USA have limited budgets due to the recession 
caused by the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies 2014). The volatility associated with outside funding has prompted African leaders to 
realise that external sources like foreign aid will be insufficient to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals and sustain progress beyond the 2015 target date (North-South Institute 
2012). In the current global economic context, the development of African economies has to 
depend primarily on the efforts of African countries themselves – their ability to mobilise 
domestic resources from the public and private sectors to enhance Africa’s development 
agenda (UNCTAD 2007). Domestic resources that are vital for state-building can be 
mobilised from both the public and private sectors. The public sector largely does this 
through taxation, non-tax and other forms of government revenue generation (North-South 
Institute 2012). Corporate taxes from MNEs, as explained above, are a large proportion of 
many African countries’ tax bases (Durst 2014), and it is important to preserve this tax base 
– it has the potential to contribute greatly to domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM), which can 
play a major role in fostering long-term financing for sustainable development in Africa. It 
would also ensure that African countries are weaned off long-term aid dependency, to their 
own stable and predictable sources of revenue. African countries could then take ownership 
of their development policies and implement strategies that reflect their development 
                                                          
23  UN ‘Millennium Summit’ (6-8 September 2000). Available at 
<http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml accessed 24 May 2015>. The Millennium 
Development Goals are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote 
gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. 
24  Rio + 20 ‘United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development’, available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/>, 
accessed 25 May 2015.  
25  UN Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, available at 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal>, accessed 24 May 2015. 
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priorities. This would facilitate effective fiscal planning – resources could be allocated to 
priority sectors, rather than being constrained by donor conditions that often dictate the 
sectors to which aid should flow. DRM would also foster government accountability to its 
taxpaying citizens, ensuring governments pay more attention to the demands of taxpaying 
citizens than is the case when they are heavily dependent on foreign aid.  
 
Although in recent years there has been increased growth of DRM in many African countries 
– in sub-Saharan Africa DRM is estimated to constitute about 70 per cent of development 
finance, with the 30 per cent shortfall usually being filled by loans, aid or other forms of public 
finance – there are still enormous challenges facing DRM in sub-Saharan Africa. This is 
because the tax bases across much of Africa are very narrow, and the tax burden falls 
disproportionately on the small formal sector of the economy (North-South Institute 2012). In 
addition, the saving rate in most African countries is low, and institutional capacity to mobilise 
domestic resources is weak (Culpeper and Bhushan 2010). DRM is also hampered by the 
fact that many African countries grant tax incentives to foreign investors in order to 
encourage foreign investments; tax incentives have been noted to distort resource allocation 
leading to sub-optimal investment decisions that are harmful to long-term growth. Many 
African tax statutes also have various tax exemptions that are costly in terms of forgone 
revenue. The exemptions complicate tax systems, and open the door to political interference 
and corruption (Culpeper and Bhushan 2010). The limited tax reporting, low levels of tax 
education among the population, the general culture of non-tax compliance, weak capacity 
and inadequate resourcing of most tax administrations, as well as the lack of political will to 
insulate tax administration from political incursions, all contribute to low DRM. Tax officials 
often have great discretionary power, which leads to pervasive corruption and a lack of 
transparency that inhibit citizens’ willingness to comply with tax laws. The fact that many 
African countries levy high taxes, coupled with incomprehensible and complex tax legislation 
in some countries, also encourages tax evasion and avoidance, undermining collection. Over 
and above the above factors, the main stumbling block to DRM in Africa is capital flight – as 
discussed below.  
 
 
5  BEPS and perspectives on capital flight in 
Africa: distinguishing licit and illicit financial 
flows 
 
From a legal perspective, it is important to clarify that the problem of capital flight in Africa 
falls under two main categories: licit – legal – capital flight, and illicit capital flight. Global 
Financial Integrity notes that ‘Illicit financial flows are by far the most damaging economic 
problem facing Africa’, and it is considered the ‘most pernicious global development 
challenge of our time’ (Baker 2005: 25). There is, however, no universally-agreed definition 
of illicit financial flows, and their boundaries are disputed. The term generally implies the 
movement of money in a way that contravenes the laws or regulations of a country. Such 
movements of money can be a product of illegal activities, such as tax evasion, organised 
crime, customs fraud, money laundering, terrorist financing and bribery. However, some 
controversial definitions include in illicit financial flows certain corporate tax-avoiding 
practices, such as BEPS, which are legal (Payne et al. 2014). 
 
The OECD acknowledges that although there are cases of illegal abuses (which are the 
exception rather than the rule), MNEs engaged in BEPS comply with the legal requirements 
of the countries involved, in that they use legal methods to circumvent the application of a 
country’s tax law. The exceptions could (as explained above) cover cases where taxpayers 
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secretly conceal their foreign investments from their domestic tax authorities, blurring the 
dividing line between illegal tax evasion and tax avoidance. In the past, taxpayers made use 
of banking secrecy rules that operated in tax-haven jurisdictions and some low-tax countries, 
by which the ownership of assets or income or their business transactions were to be kept 
from the knowledge of the tax authorities (United Nations 1984). It is these activities, which 
are difficult to monitor due to the secrecy involved, that have prompted some civil society 
organisations to equate the resultant BEPS to illicit financial flows. It is, however, worth 
noting that Global Financial Integrity stated in its report Illicit Financial Flows from Developing 
Countries Between 2003 and 2012 (2014b) that capital flight includes both licit and illicit 
capital, noting that licit capital flight is recorded and tracked, significantly lowering the 
probability that it has a corrupt or criminal source. In contrast, illicit financial flows are by 
nature unrecorded, and cannot be used as public funds or private investment capital in their 
country of origin (Kar and Spanjers 2014: para 2). 
 
Nevertheless, over the last few years public confusion on these matters has been created by 
a strong drive from some civil society organisations (e.g. Oxfam, Global Financial Integrity 
and the Tax Justice Network) that have come up with estimates to provide a proxy for BEPS 
behaviour by equating BEPS to illicit finical flows. There are, however, very few studies that 
have made a proper evaluation of the extent of illicit capital transfers from Africa. Part of the 
reason for this is the unavailability of data and the lack of transparency by the entities 
involved in these transactions. The main estimates in this regard have been produced by 
studies carried out by Global Financial Integrity, which estimate that tax and illicit capital flight 
from Africa is between $50 billion and $80 billion per annum, and in some cases revenue lost 
exceeds the level of aid received.26 Furthermore, that over a thirty-nine-year period Africa lost 
a staggering $854 billion in cumulative capital flight. Even though there are significant 
regional differences, the overwhelming bulk of capital flight through illicit means was from 
sub-Saharan African countries. Western African countries, particularly those endowed with 
natural resources, also had very high amounts of illicit transfers (Thabo Mbeki Foundation 
n.d.). Illicit financial flows from Africa are said to have spiked from 2000 to 2008 relative to 
earlier decades, mostly driven by increased average outflows from the western, central and 
southern regions due to rising income levels fuelled by the global price increase of 
commodities (Thabo Mbeki Foundation n.d.). Global Financial Integrity notes that ‘these illicit 
outflows sapped 5.7 per cent of GDP from sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade, more 
than any other region in the developing world (Thabo Mbeki Foundation n.d.). Perhaps most 
alarmingly, ‘outflows from sub-Saharan Africa were found to be growing at an average 
inflation-adjusted rate of more than 20 per cent per year, underscoring the urgency with 
which policymakers should address illicit financial flows’ (Global Financial Integrity 2014a: 1).  
 
In a 2013 joint report by the African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, it is 
reported that ‘the problem with illicit outflows from Africa is so severe that after adjusting all 
recorded flows of money to and from the continent (e.g. debt, investment, exports, imports, 
foreign aid, remittances) illicit financial outflows from Africa between 1980 and 2009 meant 
that Africa was a net creditor to the rest of the world by up to US$1.4 trillion’ (African 
Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity 2013: 2). Global Financial Integrity reports 
that South Africa alone has lost out on billions in tax revenue in the past decade as large 
corporations, wealthy individuals and criminal syndicates slipped nearly R1 trillion out of the 
country. Global Financial Integrity notes that South Africa suffered ‘illicit financial flows’ 
totalling more than $122 billion between 2003 and the end of 2012 (Kar and Spanjers 2014; 
Times Live 2015). Furthermore, in 2012 alone $29.1 billion left the country under the radar. 
As a proportion of the size of the economy, South Africa's illicit financial flows came to 7.6 
per cent, nearly twice the average for developing countries.  
 
                                                          
26  As reported by Thabo Mbeki Foundation (n.d); see also ATAF (n.d.).  
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Several economic models have been used to provide estimates of illicit financial flows and 
capital flight. The most widely-used model subtracts the total funds actually used by a 
country from the total funds entering that country. The inflow of funds is defined as any 
increase in foreign debt plus incoming foreign direct investment. Funds used are those 
necessary to finance the deficit in the current account (one of the components of the balance 
of payments) and to add to the country’s official reserves. If there are more funds coming in 
than funds being used, the resulting shortfall is considered to be illicit flows (Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith 2008).27 For example, a study carried out by Ndikumana and Boyce (which 
came up with almost similar conclusions as those above) estimates that the total real capital 
flight from Africa from 1970-2004 amounted to $444 billion (Ndikumana and Boyce 2010). 
This is equivalent to 104 per cent of Africa’s exports and 124 per cent of Africa’s imports 
(2007 values). The study further found that annual capital flight amounted to $49 billion/year 
averaged over 2000-2008, which would fill 54 per cent of Africa’s infrastructure financing gap 
(Thabo Mbeki Foundation n.d.).  
 
With MNEs not paying their fair share of taxes in the countries they operate in, many 
governments are also contemplating the vexed issue of determining and measuring the 
extent of tax evasion and/or avoidance.28 Although the question of how much revenue is lost 
due to profit shifting is interesting for the public, it has been noted that there are 
methodological flaws underlying the estimates which prevent them from being very reliable. 
For instance, a Report by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation notes that 
some estimates approximate taxable income or tax payments in absence of tax avoidance by 
using profits from financial accounts multiplied by the statutory tax rate to capture differences 
between financial and tax accounting (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 2012). 
Other estimates approximate foreign capital stocks multiplied by a deemed return and an 
average tax rate without considering the role of tax incentives and tax base regulations 
(Fuest and Riedel 2010). Comparing taxable profits with these inadequate benchmarks 
reveals conceptual differences between the underlying statistics, rather than the scale of 
profit-shifting activity.  
 
Even though African countries, like other developing countries, face significant challenges 
that impact on revenue collection as a result of illicit financial flows, equating BEPS to illicit 
financial flows is not correct in terms of international tax law norms. As indicated above, 
BEPS is a result of perceived weakness in international tax laws, as well as lack of 
administrative capacity to fully assess and audit international tax risks that are exploited by 
MNEs. Illicit financial flows are a result of a wide range of illegal flows of money, such as 
from organised crimes, money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery and customs fraud. 
Equating BEPS to illicit financial flows fosters confusion in understanding international tax 
principles, and in finding solutions to the problem of capital flight. 
 
Although all financial flows (whether illicit or licit) have an impact on revenue collection, the 
legal solutions to resolving licit BEPS issues are different from those required to resolve illicit 
financial flows. Curtailing BEPS requires reforming the international tax system and coming 
up with anti-tax avoidance measures – which is what the OECD BEPS agenda is all about –
whereas curtailing illicit financial flows requires criminal sanctions. It should also be noted 
that there is no one tax avoidance measure that can be used to effectively curtail all BEPS 
schemes. The transfer pricing legislation that is required to curtail transfer pricing schemes 
cannot be applied to curtail treaty abuse; neither can one apply the controlled foreign 
company rules that are used to prevent the deferral of taxes to curtail schemes involving 
excessive deductions of interest. This is why the BEPS Action Plan has various Action items, 
                                                          
27  See also Thabo Mbeki Foundation (n.d.). 
28  This is exemplified by a recent UK poll which showed that 59% of the UK public thinks that tax avoidance is morally 
wrong. See Economia ‘Majority says unacceptable to avoid tax’ (2 March 2015), available at 
<http://economia.icaew.com/news/march-2015/majority-says-unacceptable-to-avoid-tax#sthash.XUU2VtlW.dpuf>, 
accessed 18 May 2015. 
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requiring countries to come up with different anti-avoidance rules that can be applied to 
curtail the BEPS that arises from various tax avoidance schemes. 
 
In the case of illicit financial flows, the very use of the term ‘illicit’ implies that the illegal 
nature of such activities calls for criminal action. Illegal tax evasion is a criminal matter, not a 
BEPS matter. Tax evasion has to be proved in terms of the relevant country’s penal codes, 
as would be the case for any other criminal activity resulting in illegal movement of money. 
Illicit financial flows through trade mis-invoicing, which was estimated by Global Financial 
Integrity in 2012 to account for nearly 99 per cent of illicit financial outflows from Africa (Kar 
and Spanjers 2014), is not a BEPS matter, and should not be confused with the concept of 
transfer pricing – a BEPS matter. Trade mis-invoicing falls under the category of revenue 
laws that deal with customs. It is a customs fraud, which involves buyers and sellers 
presenting fraudulent documentation to customs officials. They falsify the value of their 
trade by under- or over-invoicing their trade documents to be less or more than the actual 
market value, in order to circumvent the payment of customs duties (Times Live 2015). The 
2014 UNCTAD Trade and Development report notes that illicit flows of capital through 
developing countries due to trade miss-invoicing is one of the most pressing challenges 
facing policymakers, since it costs countries billions of dollars in revenue (UNCTAD 2014). 
The UNCTAD report recommends that in order to prevent trade mis-invoicing, governments 
need to resort to capital management measures, including capital controls (UNCTAD 2014). 
 
There is no doubt that, as is the case with BEPS, international cooperation is required to 
address illicit financial flows. At the August 2014 US/Africa Leaders Summit, US President 
Obama expressed concern about illicit financial flows from Africa. This resulted in an 
agreement between the US and some African countries to form a partnership on curbing illicit 
financial flows from African economies. Commenting on this partnership, Global Financial 
Integrity cautioned that any effective partnership must address deficiencies in both the US 
and Africa that facilitate the haemorrhage of illicit capital from Africa. Global Financial 
Integrity noted that: 
 
For every country losing money illicitly, there is another country absorbing it. Illicit 
financial outflows are facilitated by financial opacity in tax havens and in major 
economies like the United States … While governance remains an issue for many 
African countries, structural deficiencies in the U.S. financial system are just as 
responsible for driving the outflow of illicit capital. This initiative cannot place the onus 
entirely on the shoulders of African governments. The burden for curtailing these illicit 
flows must be shared equally by policymakers in the U.S. and in Africa for this 
partnership to be effective.  
(Global Financial Integrity 2014a: 2). 
 
There is also no doubt that transparency, through exchange of information between 
countries, will play a major role in exposing both BEPS and illicit financial flows. However, 
equating illicit financial flows to BEPS under the current legal framework is a misconception 
of the law, and addressing BEPS under the umbrella of illicit financial flows is not in line with 
international tax law norms.  
 
In the outcome document of the UN’s ‘Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development’ held in Addis Ababa 13-16 July 2015, the Heads of State and Government and 
High Representatives affirmed as follows:  
 
 We will redouble efforts to substantially reduce illicit financial flows by 2030, with a view 
to eventually eliminating them, including by combating tax evasion and corruption 
through strengthened national regulation and increased international cooperation. We 
will also reduce opportunities for tax avoidance, and consider inserting anti-abuse 
clauses in all tax treaties. We will enhance disclosure practices and transparency in 
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both source and destination countries, including by seeking to ensure transparency in 
all financial transactions between Governments and companies to relevant tax 
authorities. We will make sure that all companies, including multinationals, pay taxes to 
the Governments of countries where economic activity occurs and value is created, in 
accordance with national and international laws and policies. 
(United Nations 2015: para 23) 
 
To help combat illicit flows, participants agreed to invite the IMF, World Bank and UN to 
assist both source and destination countries (United Nations 2015). They also agreed to 
‘identify, assess and act on money-laundering risks, including through effective 
implementation of the Financial Action Task Force standards on anti-money-
laundering/counter-terrorism financing’. They also encouraged ‘information-sharing among 
financial institutions to mitigate the potential impact of the anti-money-laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism standard on reducing access to financial services’ 
(United Nations 2015: para 24). With respect to licit financial flows involving tax avoidance, 
the outcome document welcomed the work of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and the work of the OECD on base erosion and 
profit shifting (United Nations 2015).     
 
 
6  BEPS in Africa 
 
Concerns about BEPS are not new in Africa. Like other developing countries, for decades 
African countries have been victims of this phenomenon, with their residents shifting money 
to developed countries and tax-haven jurisdictions. The loss of tax revenue as a result of 
BEPS leads to critical under-funding of public investment that could help promote economic 
growth, and it impacts negatively on badly-needed finances to fund public infrastructure such 
as roads, hospitals and schools. BEPS undermines the integrity of the tax system. It 
discourages tax morality, and encourages a perception that the tax system is unfair. This, in 
turn, reduces voluntary compliance by all taxpayers. It also undermines competition, since 
MNEs have a competitive advantage over enterprises that operate at domestic level 
(especially small- and medium-size enterprises).  
 
It has to be pointed out that there are some MNEs whose business transactions in Africa are 
generally legally acceptable. Such companies assert that their tax concerns in Africa are 
focused on core compliance rather than tax planning, given the increasing efforts of revenue 
officials to curtail tax avoidance. Furthermore, such companies contend that the relatively 
small size of African operations in certain sectors does not lend itself to tax planning projects 
that can have an overall impact on their global effective income tax rates. Nevertheless, 
African country tax officials deal with many cases of MNEs that are involved in tax avoidance 
schemes that are eroding their tax bases. There has also been circumstantial evidence of the 
same – for example, the famous SABMiller report by ActionAid, which exposed the tax 
dodged by SABMiller in Africa (particularly in Ghana) (ActionAid 2012). ActionAid explains 
that many of the company’s local beer brands like Castle, Stone and Chibuku were invented 
in African countries like Ghana, South African and Zambia. These brands were sold by the 
London-based beer company SABMiller to its subsidiary in Netherlands to take advantage of 
Netherland’s advantageous tax rules, which permit companies to pay low taxes on royalties 
(ActionAid 2012). Although there is circumstantial evidence, such as the above, that BEPS 
behaviour is widespread in Africa, it is difficult to reach solid conclusions about how much 
BEPS actually occurs. There is no accurate estimate of the amount of profits shifted (Fuest 
et al. 2013). 
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7  Factors that exacerbate BEPS in Africa 
 
7.1 Lack of relevant international tax laws in place, or clear understanding of 
how these laws work 
  
Many African countries do not have proper international tax laws in place to counter BEPS. 
Historically, the reason behind this is that most African countries did not encourage 
investment aboard by their residents, as these countries enforced strict exchange controls. 
Many African countries had adopted a policy that the growth of their economies could best 
be achieved by encouraging domestic production – with domestically-owned firms producing 
goods and services for domestic consumption (Thuronyi 1998). Their tax systems prioritised 
the taxation of domestic income of resident taxpayers (Thuronyi 1998). This meant that the 
development of international tax laws in Africa lagged behind that of developed countries.  
 
With the increasing internationalisation of economic relations, many African countries are 
now paying attention to international tax issues. This is especially so given that many African 
countries have large resource bases that are exploited by foreign investors (Thuronyi 1998). 
Despite the various geopolitical and infrastructural challenges that pose difficulties to doing 
business on the continent (Corey 2008), various countries are making progress in putting in 
place the right environment to encourage investors to enter their markets. This has 
happened to such an extent over the last decade that foreign investors have begun to 
recognise that ‘Africa is the new frontier of the global economy’ (Corey 2008). The OECD 
has also noted that ‘Africa is the new emerging markets investment frontier’ (Santiso 2007). 
As global capital starts flowing to frontier markets across Africa, governments will have to 
deal with the resultant tax schemes.29 This, coupled with the globalisation of the world 
economy, implies that African countries can no longer isolate their tax systems. The 
development of multinational enterprises, which have shifted their management structure 
from country-specific operating models to global models, implies that African countries 
cannot ignore the need to come up with the relevant international tax laws to address BEPS 
(OECD 2013b). The adoption of international tax rules also has the added advantage of 
increasing the capacity of a country to enforce taxation of the domestic income of residents, 
through provisions relating to the exchange of information on tax matters. 
 
7.2 Tax treaty negotiation dynamics that contribute to BEPS  
 
Double-tax treaties are an important aspect of international tax laws. However many African 
countries have signed few tax treaties, and some of those treaties were entered into mainly 
as a political gesture – not because there were significant capital flows from the developed 
countries concerned (OECD 2013b). Many African countries took the view that they did not 
need tax treaties, on the basis that signing treaties would result in the loss of taxing rights. It 
would mean giving up part of the revenue from source taxation, and being bound by 
restrictive bilateral treaty provisions (e.g. the provisions that require source countries to levy 
reduced withholding taxes on dividends and interest). However, over the last decade the 
attitude of many African countries to tax treaties has changed, as demonstrated by their 
expanding tax treaty network. The new policy shift is partly because many African countries 
have now come to appreciate that, despite the fact that tax treaties can be restrictive, there 
are benefits that result from entering into tax treaties in that they can encourage and facilitate 
capital inflows from capital-exporting countries (Thuronyi 1998). This, however, puts African 
countries in a position whereby, in the absence of measures that counter tax avoidance, the 
                                                          
29  Rodrik (2015), where he states that ‘so-called “frontier market economies” are the latest fad in investment circles. 
Though these low-income countries – including Bangladesh and Vietnam in Asia, Honduras and Bolivia in Latin 
America, and Kenya and Ghana in Africa – have small, undeveloped financial markets, they are growing rapidly and are 
expected to become the emerging economies of the future’. 
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treaties entered into can be abused, resulting in BEPS. This is a major concern, since the tax 
laws of most African countries are often not sufficiently developed to prevent BEPS arising 
from the abuse of tax treaties (Thuronyi 1998). Treaty abuse is also exacerbated when 
countries negotiate treaty provisions that are not in their favour, but rather reflect the position 
of the other contracting state (Akunobela 2012). The ability to negotiate favourable provisions 
depends a lot on the treaty-negotiating power of the relevant country. In general, developed 
countries are better skilled in negotiating tax treaties than developing countries (PwC 2011). 
The UN notes that: 
 
Developing countries, especially the least developed ones, often lack the necessary 
expertise and experience to efficiently interpret and administer tax treaties. This may 
result in difficult, time-consuming and, in a worst case scenario, ineffective application 
of tax treaties. Moreover, skills gaps in the interpretation and administration of existing 
tax treaties may jeopardise developing countries’ capacity to be effective treaty 
partners, especially as it relates to cooperation in combating international tax evasion. 
There is a clear need for capacity-building initiatives, which would strengthen the skills 
of the relevant officials in developing countries in the tax area and, thus, contribute to 
further developing their role in supporting the global efforts aimed at improving the 
investment climate and effectively curbing international tax evasion  
(United Nations 2013 iii). 
 
Negotiating tax treaties requires knowledge of international tax law and tax treaty principles, 
as well as taxing authorities having a certain level of technical knowledge. The challenge for 
most developing countries is the lack of administrative capacity to negotiate tax treaties 
(Thuronyi 1998). When residents of the other contracting state conduct business in the 
developing country and, on the basis of that treaty, pay nil or minimum taxes in the source 
state, disputes often arise due to a lack of understanding of what was signed for. For tax 
officials not conversant with tax treaty issues, it is important to emphasise that generally 
treaties do not impose tax – rather they limit the taxes that can be imposed by the contracting 
states (Olivier and Honiball 2011). A treaty cannot impose tax where the income is not 
subject to tax under domestic legislation (Olivier and Honiball 2011). It is very important to 
understand this, as loss of taxes often arises due to a perception that the relevant transaction 
ought to have been taxed, whereas domestic law does not provide for its taxation.  
 
7.3 Limited tax administrative capacity 
 
Many African countries have limited capacity to implement solutions to curtail BEPS. It is 
acknowledged that African tax systems are not homogenous, and that both the level of 
economic development of African countries and the level of capacity to deal with the 
challenges associated with BEPS vary immensely (G20 2014). To curtail BEPS, African 
counties need to revamp their administrative capacity. This entails employing competent tax 
officials in various fields, such as accountants, lawyers and economists, who can understand 
and administer complex international tax laws. Continuous training is required for such 
officials to ensure they are up-to-date with current international developments. For African 
governments to hire and retain specialised tax officials, they need to adopt policies which 
ensure that these officials are paid salaries comparable to those in the private sector. 
Administrative capacity also requires training such officials in technical expertise to carry out 
tax audits. This requires electronic and technological advancement of tax systems, so as to 
handle BEPS issues such as those relating to automatic exchange of information in tax 
matters. Measures to improve the competency of tax officials have to be combined with 
measures to ensure their integrity, as this is key to enhancing revenue collection. The large 
discretionary powers given to tax authorities often encourage corruption, which must be 
rooted out.  
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These matters are already recognised in a number of countries, which have begun 
introducing reform programmes. These include Ethiopia, which is working on enhancing the 
capacity of the revenue authority – a central part of Ethiopia’s public sector reform 
programme; Cameroon, which introduced administrative reforms in 2004 followed by the 
2007 Fiscal Reform Commission; Tanzania, which introduced reforms to strengthen tax 
administration to curtail extensive loopholes and rampant corruption; and Rwanda, which, as 
a result of recommendations by the IMF, introduced tax policy reform measures from 2010 
(Culpeper and Bhushan 2010). 
 
 
8  The relevance of the OECD BEPS project to 
Africa  
 
The OECD 2013 BEPS Action Plan notes that, in order to ensure international consensus in 
addressing BEPS, it would take into account the perspectives of developing countries 
(OECD 2013b). However criticism has been raised that the OECD agenda has been driven 
by the interests of developed countries and that the interests of developing countries are not 
being addressed, since they were not consulted to table their concerns before the OECD 15-
Point Action agenda was drafted and closed. The OECD’s initial regional consultations only 
served as orientation to a pre-existing plan. This fell short of global equal participation in the 
formulation of the international tax reforms. The BEPS Action agenda is criticised for 
embodying rules set by a few countries, and thereby reinforcing a system that exacerbates 
global inequality.30 The BEPS Action Plan portrays a lack of focus or understanding of the 
specific need of developing countries. 
 
The OECD’s approach has also been criticised for not addressing basic fundamental 
international tax reform, or re-examining the basic principles of the international tax system 
that are pivotal in addressing BEPS – such as the allocation of tax income between 
residence and source countries. The OECD chose to focus on curtailing sophisticated tax 
avoidance schemes by strengthening existing anti-avoidance provisions, to ensure that they 
are more effective in curtailing BEPS under modern business models. However, since 
taxpayers have manipulated these very anti-avoidance provisions to a point of being 
ineffective, there is little reason to expect that strengthening the rules further will prevent 
BEPS. Some advanced tax avoidance practices may have been ignored. It has thus been 
postulated that the OECD’s BEPS Action Agenda is a reactionary approach to meet revenue 
demands by European countries to cover their budgetary deficits after the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis. This left many of them in a position of capital importers, and they are now 
disadvantaged by the international tax rules that were crafted to suit them. Now that 
damaging effects have been felt by rich countries, they have found the political will to look for 
solutions to the problems that developing countries have been struggling with for decades. 
Criticism has also been raised about the ambitious two-year period that the OECD gave for 
countries to address the 15-Point BEPS Action Agenda, without consideration of the 
administrative, economic and systemic challenges that many developing countries face. 
 
 
                                                          
30  Francophone LIC Finance Ministers Network, Press Note, ‘LIC Ministers Demand Their Fair Share of Global Tax 
Revenues’ (9 October 2014, Washington DC). The Press Note states Finance Francophone LICs ‘require a more 
fundamental reform of the international tax system in order to get their fair share of global tax revenues … current 
G20/OECD initiatives against tax avoidance and evasion are not tackling the key practices which most reduce LIC 
revenues …The cause of these problems is the lack of decision making power for LICs in global tax discussions. 
Consultation by the IMF and OECD cannot be sufficient: LICs need an equal seat at the table’. 
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9  How should Africa respond to the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan?  
 
No African country is a member of the OECD, and African countries are not bound to follow 
the OECD recommendations. Although the primary focus of the OECD is on its member 
countries, its additional goals of contributing to the expansion of world trade and the 
development of the world economy affect non-members as well.31 It would, therefore, be in 
the interest of African countries to respond to the OECD recommendations, since BEPS is a 
global challenge that requires global solutions. All countries (including African economies) 
have a shared interest in strengthening the integrity of the international corporate tax system. 
Given that many African countries have large resource bases that are exploited by foreign 
investors, it is important that they take proactive steps to prevent BEPS (G20 2014).  
 
It is also important to note that, despite all the above criticism of the OECD BEPS agenda, 
internationally there has been a shift in the philosophy of some governments that 
encouraged the perpetuation of certain notorious tax avoidance schemes. For example, the 
Irish government has taken measures to close tax loopholes that permit the use of the 
‘double Irish sandwich’ scheme, which allowed companies registered in Ireland to be 
stateless and thus tax pay nowhere (IDS 2014). Switzerland has signed the Multinational 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, thereby committing to cooperating with 
other governments on exchanging information on tax matters (IDS 2014). The will to address 
BEPS is not only there at a governmental and international level, but MNEs also appear to 
have pulled back on aggressive tax avoidance due to increasing concern about reputational 
risks as a result of controversies in the UK over tax arrangements of MNEs such as 
Starbucks, Amazon and Google. Tax avoidance and resultant reputational risks are now a 
topic of discussion in company Board meetings.  
 
With the current global stance on BEPS, African countries should not be passive to the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan: they should make use of this opportunity to ensure that their long-
standing BEPS concerns are addressed while the international political will and support of 
the international community still stands. African countries should use the current international 
political will to address BEPS, and get together under regional organisations such as the 
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF - which promotes and facilitates mutual cooperation 
among African tax administrators), to develop a united position on those BEPS priority 
concerns that are relevant for them. African countries should ensure they present their views 
on the different OECD discussion drafts of the various Action Plans. Currently comments on 
these discussion drafts are largely from representatives of big business and lobbyists from 
the tax avoidance industry. Civil society, mainly in developed countries, has also provided 
detailed and constructive comments on all the discussion drafts, but there has not been 
much comment from African countries. There is a need for a stronger voice from Africa, and 
more civic education on fiscal matters. The OECD has, however, engaged extensively with 
developing countries that have have participated directly in the technical working groups and 
indirectly through regional consultations where they have shaped the outcomes of the BEPS 
Project.  In November 2014 the OECD launched a new strategy for deepening developing 
countries’ engagement in the BEPS Project (OECD 2014a). In 2016, the OECD launched an 
inclusive framework for BEPS implementation on an equal footing for all countries that 
commit to the process (OECD 2016). 
 
This is important for achieving principled and sustainable reforms to lay a foundation for 
international tax rules suited for the twenty-first century. African countries must call on all 
stakeholders, such as the G20 countries, international and regional organisations, civil 
                                                          
31 See OECD (n.d.). 
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society and donors, to raise awareness of the significance of BEPS issues in Africa by 
holding high-level political dialogue on these issues with Ministries of Finance and other 
relevant ministries (G20 2014). African countries need to change the impression that has 
been created that they are instruction-takers not decision-makers.    
 
 
10  Initiatives in Africa responding to the 
OECD BEPS agenda  
 
10.1 Initiatives by regional bodies 
  
In March 2014, AFAF held a conference in Johannesburg on the Global Tax Agenda for 
heads of African tax administrations and Ministries of Finance. Participants from twenty-nine 
African countries and OECD officials deliberated on the ‘New Rules of the Global Tax 
Agenda’ and the G20/OECD-driven project on BEPS, and considered an African response to 
these developments. In its Conference Outcomes Document, ATAF noted that the 
development of rules for global taxation should address the concerns of all countries and that 
it should be inclusive, to ensure that the international tax rules can be applied effectively by 
developed, emerging and developing countries (ATAF 2014). In this regard, ATAF notes that 
it is imperative that all African countries are involved in the BEPS process. Africa must use 
the opportunity to shape the issues in the 15 Action Point project to address Africa’s 
concerns, to ensure that sufficient attention is given to the different levels of readiness of 
African tax administrations to address BEPS, and their resource and capacity limitations 
(ATAF 2014). ATAF notes that much needs to be done to improve administrative capacity, 
broaden the tax base, and increase tax revenue in Africa as a proportion of GDP (ATAF 
2014). Consequently it made a commitment to facilitate African participation in the Global 
Tax Agenda, and to put in place structures to enable on-going dialogue about BEPS on the 
continent and internationally. This would ensure that African countries understand the 
G20/OECD processes, and can engage with these countries more productively (ATAF 2014). 
To this end, ATAF developed an African Work Plan on the Global Tax Agenda, for which a 
‘Cross-Border Taxation Technical Committee’ was established to provide guidance on an 
African BEPS approach and to give input into the OECD BEPS process.32 ATAF recognises 
that Africa needs to re-examine its own regional tax cooperation and practices, and develop 
an approach on how the continent will engage with the rest of the world on these matters. It 
has therefore called on African countries to strengthen their support and commitment to 
ATAF, as this will allow ATAF greater impact in engaging with the OECD (ATAF 2014).  
 
Following its 2014 consultative conference on ‘New Rules of the Global Tax Agenda’, ATAF 
convened another conference on ‘Cross-Border Taxation in Africa’ in April 2015 in 
Johannesburg. The conference focused on an African position on the BEPS Action Points, 
and on providing African countries an opportunity to define the base-eroding practises that 
are most relevant to Africa. Speaking at this conference, South Africa’s Minister of Finance 
reiterated that it is critical that African countries use all opportunities to make inputs into the 
BEPS project to ensure that the views and experiences of African countries shape the 
development of potential BEPS-related solutions, and that African countries should ensure 
that any redefinition of the international tax rules should take into consideration the needs 
and conditions of the African continent. Further, that ‘Africa must protect its own tax base and 
advance domestic resource mobilisation through a common voice, a common concern and a 
common action plan.’ The Minister remarked that the current global focus on international 
taxation offers a unique opportunity for African leaders to embark on their own continental 
                                                          
32 ATAF Secretariat ‘Ist Meeting Cross-Border Technical Committee’ (21-22 November 2014). 
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taxation renaissance: this should include giving consideration to the establishment of a Tax 
Policy and Tax Administration Commission, which is missing within the structures of the 
African Union. Such a Commission would deal with harmonising the continent’s tax policy, 
legislation and administration, as well as seeking ways to improve cross-border cooperation 
and thereby optimising continental revenue mobilisation. In this regard, ATAF has indicated 
that it intends to formalise its engagement with the African Union at ministerial level, as it is 
of the view that the involvement of African Heads of State in the implementation of agreed 
proposals contemplated in the OECD BEPS process is critical to resolving BEPS in Africa.33 
 
10.2 BEPS initiatives at national level 
 
Efforts to address BEPS in Africa have also been made at national level. In this regard, 
South Africa appears to have taken the lead. In July 2013, South Africa’s then Minister of 
Finance appointed a tax review committee (the Davis Tax Committee) to inquire into the role 
of South Africa’s tax system in the promotion of inclusive economic growth, employment 
creation, development and fiscal sustainability.34 On the international front the Committee is 
required to address concerns about BEPS, especially in the context of corporate income tax, 
as identified by the OECD and G20. In December 2014, the Davis Tax Committee released 
its first BEPS Interim Report for public comment. African countries are looking to South Africa 
for guidance on how to move forward on these issues, and they are keenly following the work 
of the Davis Tax Committee. The outcome of the work of the Davis Tax Committee is 
therefore of critical importance for regional and continental integration. 
 
At the November 2013 conference on ‘The G-20 and Africa's Economic Growth and 
Transformation’, South Africa’s then Minister of Finance stated that the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) aims to ensure companies and wealthy individuals pay their fair 
share of taxes (Kotch 2013). The Minister noted that SARS was dealing with several cases of 
BEPS which impact on billions of rand of tax which is payable to South Africa, and that SARS 
had picked up a number of cases of high net worth individuals who are not paying their fair 
share. The Minister further remarked that South Africa was taking a front-row position in 
global tax reforms (Kotch 2013). 
 
Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD, it was awarded OECD observer status 
in 2004 (Olivier and Honiball 2011), and is a member of the OECD BEPS Committee. South 
Africa is also the only African country that is a member of the G20. This does not mean that 
South Africa’s membership to these international bodies is representative of the interests of 
African countries. Nevertheless, as a major economic power on the African continent, it is 
important that South Africa champions the cause of Africa in the OECD BEPS Committee. As 
a member of the G20 Development Working Group, South Africa plays an important role in 
conveying the views of developing economies in Africa (G20 2014). 
 
 
  
                                                          
33  Minister Nhlanhla Nene: African Tax Administration Forum Conference on Cross Border Taxation in Africa (21 April 
2015). Available at <http://www.gov.za/speeches/page-1-11-speech-minister-finance-mr-nhlanhla-nene-ataf-
conference-cross-border-taxation>, accessed 28 April 2015.  
34  The Davis Tax Committee ‘Introduction’, available at <http://www.taxcom.org.za/>, accessed 12 May 2015. 
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11  International initiatives that African 
countries should embrace to improve their tax 
systems and administrative capacity  
 
11.1 OECD initiatives on BEPS that can benefit Africa  
 
Although the OECD’s main concern is its member countries, following the rise of emerging 
economies like the BRICS countries over the last decade the OECD has tried to involve 
developing countries in issues relating to tax treaties and international tax laws.35 It has, for 
instance, invited developing countries to serve as observers to some of its meetings. South 
Africa was awarded OECD observer status in 2004. The OECD has also selected some 
developing countries to register objections to positions taken by the OECD on its 
Commentary to its Model Tax Convention. However, these initiatives are unlikely to result in 
developing countries influencing the core decisions taken by the OECD on tax matters, or 
other matters that OECD countries may take a strong position on (McIntyre 2015). With 
respect to BEPS in developing countries, the OECD has made a commitment to support 
developing country revenue authorities (OECD 2014b). It has, for instance, pledged to help 
in funding capacity development in African tax authorities through initiatives like ‘Tax 
Inspectors without Borders’: African countries should take advantage of this.36 This initiative 
enables the transfer of tax audit knowledge and skills to tax administrations in developing 
countries through a ‘learning by doing’ approach. Tax officials, who may be currently serving 
or recently retired, are deployed to work directly with local tax officials on audits concerning 
international tax matters, and to share general audit practices.37  
 
11.2 G20 initiatives on BEPS in Africa 
 
The G20 acknowledges that many developing countries have limited capacity to implement 
global BEPS solutions, and that this will affect their ability to reap the full benefits of 
international tax reforms (G20 2014). The G20 countries have pledged to work with 
developing countries to help them build effective tax systems, so as to enforce BEPS rules 
and to effectively use tax data (e.g. audit capacity) to ensure compliance with international 
standards and norms. The G20 also recognises that the economic development of African 
countries varies immensely, as does the level of development of their tax laws and their 
administrative capacity to deal with the challenges associated with implementing 
international tax reforms (G20 2014). Thus an assessment of how to strengthen tax systems 
must be done on a case-by-case basis. The G20 recognises that developing economies 
need regular, proactive engagement in the G20/OECD BEPS process, particularly for those 
countries that may be harder to reach due to geography, capacity, size, or other reasons that 
may impact upon their ability to effectively implement and benefit from the outcomes of the 
BEPS Action Plan (G20 2014). Such countries may require tailored approaches to implement 
the outcomes of the BEPS Action Plan, without undermining the integrity of the international 
tax system. African countries in which the G20 reported activity are: Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia (G20 2014). In these countries measures have been taken to 
provide support for capacity development, with a focus on shaping the fundamental building 
blocks of tax policy and administration to ensure that these economies can reap the full 
                                                          
35  BRICS stands for five emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). These countries are 
considered to be in a similar stage of newly advanced economic development, and are the leading emerging economies 
in the 21st century. 
36  OECD ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’, available at <http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxinspectors.htm>, accessed 7 July 
2015. 
37  Ibid. 
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benefits of international tax reforms and mobilise domestic resources for development. In 
particular, G20 members have made a commitment to make available tax policy and 
administration experts on a voluntary basis, based on the resource needs of the relevant 
countries.  
 
The G20 Development Working Group on BEPS has been actively involved in Africa, 
partnering with regional tax and economic organisations such as ATAF, the African 
Organisation of English-speaking Supreme Audit Institutions, the East African Community, 
the Economic Community of West African States, and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (G20 2014). G20 members have committed to take practical steps to 
support regional tax administration forums in fulfilling their role as a bridge between the 
international tax agenda and developing economies, by facilitating capacity-building though 
providing financial or in-kind support, and participating in an advisory or knowledge-sharing 
capacity. The G20 has also called on the OECD, IMF, UN and the World Bank Group to work 
together and with regional tax administration forums to come up with practical toolkits to 
assist developing economies to implement BEPS action items as appropriate, depending on 
the outcome of each BEPS action item. The toolkits are to be coordinated and developed 
over the course of 2015 and 2016, depending on when the relevant action items are 
completed, and are intended to prioritise action items that have the greatest impact for 
developing economies (G20 2014).  
 
11.3 UN initiatives on BEPS  
 
The UN has historically championed the cause of developing countries in international tax 
issues. Its work on international tax matters has been carried out by an Ad Hoc Group of 
Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries, formed in 1968, 
comprising tax experts and officials from twenty countries acting in their individual capacity 
(McIntyre 2015). It was the work of this Ad Hoc Group of Experts that in 1980 culminated in 
the UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 
which is in favour of source countries. However the effectiveness of the UN’s work in this 
regard has been hampered due to underfunding. As a result of the Monterrey International 
Conference on Financing for Development, which called for strengthening international tax 
cooperation through enhanced dialogue among tax authorities and for special attention to be 
given to the needs of developing countries and those in transition, in November 2004 the 
UN’s Economic and Social Council elevated the UN Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters to the status of a permanent UN Committee. This 
change in status is likely to increase the voice of developing countries in international forums 
dealing with tax issues (McIntyre 2015). At the subsequent 2008 Doha Declaration on 
Financing for Development, Heads of State deliberated on whether to upgrade the UN 
Committee to governmental status or to provide more funding for it. In the Outcome 
Document of the UN’s ‘Third International Conference on Financing for Development’ held in 
Addis Ababa 13-16 July 2015, the Heads of State and Government and High 
Representatives welcomed the work of the Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters, and decided to enhance its resources in order to strengthen its 
effectiveness and operational capacity (United Nations 2015). To that end, they increased 
the frequency of its meetings to two four-day sessions per year. Member states were urged 
to support the Committee through the voluntary trust fund, to enable the Committee to fulfil 
its mandate, including supporting the increased participation of developing country experts at 
sub-committee meetings (United Nations 2015). 
 
The UN participates in the tax work of the OECD to provide insights regarding the particular 
concerns of developing countries. Commenting on the causes of BEPS, the UN notes that 
historically countries have viewed the development of domestic international tax laws as a 
matter for each sovereign state. In making these decisions too often little or no account is 
taken of either the impact their laws have on other countries, or the impact that the laws of 
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other countries have on them.38 However the tax laws and policies of one country can 
adversely affect another country’s ability to collect the tax that should be due to it. This can 
be an unintended effect, but whether it is intended or not it has a budgetary effect on the 
country losing tax revenue, thus impeding its economic development. If some countries do 
not tax their own multinationals effectively, this gives these multinationals an incentive to shift 
profits or minimise their taxable presence in other countries where they operate. In the same 
way, if countries do not tax businesses operating in their jurisdiction in an effective manner, 
this creates an incentive for multinationals to escape taxation in the country where they are 
headquartered.39 
 
The UN acknowledges that although developing countries face the same issues relating to 
BEPS as developed countries, the issues may manifest differently given the specificities of 
their legal and administrative framework (OECD 2013b). The UN has stressed that ‘efforts in 
international tax cooperation should be universal in approach and scope and should fully 
take into account the different needs and capacities of all countries, in particular least 
developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing states and 
African countries’ (United Nations 2015: para 28). The UN supports the efforts of those such 
as the OECD ‘Tax Inspectors without Borders’, and it recognised the need for technical 
assistance through multilateral, regional, bilateral and South-South cooperation, based on 
different needs of countries (United Nations 2015). 
 
In October 2013, the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
established a sub-committee on BEPS issues for developing countries.40 The mandate of the 
sub-committee is to monitor developments on BEPS, communicate them to officials in 
developing countries, and ensure their views are fed into the OECD/G20 BEPS project and 
on-going UN tax cooperation work. In 2014, the UN sub-committee released a questionnaire 
asking developing countries to provide feedback on their experience of BEPS and their 
priority BEPS concerns.41 Developing countries that made submissions are Brazil, Chile, 
China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Bangladesh, Thailand and Tonga; and from 
Africa – only South Africa, Ghana, Lesotho and Zambia. Responses were also received from 
NGOs: Christian Aid, ActionAid, the Economic Justice Network and Oxfam South Africa (UN 
2014; Peters 2015). It is important that the UN is funded to fully carry out its mandate.  
 
 
12 Addressing the OECD BEPS Action Plan 
from an African perspective  
 
Although the OECD BEPS Action Plan may have been well-intentioned, as explained above 
it was not drawn up jointly with developing countries and so does not address their 
immediate BEPS concerns. Even though BEPS is a global concern, the nature of BEPS 
concerns is not uniform for all countries. Certain BEPS schemes that work to undermine the 
European or American tax base often do not coincide with the African paradigm. The BEPS 
challenges that African (mainly capital-importing) countries face may be different in nature 
and scale from those faced by developed (mainly capital-exporting) countries (UN 2014; 
Peters 2015). The development of most African countries’ international tax laws still lags 
behind those of developed countries, and many of them have low administrative capacity, so 
                                                          
38  UN Sub-committee ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Issues for Developing Countries’, available at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/BEPS_note.pdf>, accessed 5 May 2016. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  United Nations ‘Questionnaire: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Issues for Developing Countries’, available at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BepsIssues.pdf>, accessed 24 May 2015. 
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most of the OECD 15-point Action Plan will most likely benefit African countries in the long 
term, as and when their economies and administrative capacity advances. It should also be 
noted that the BEPS project does not explore certain practical measures (such as 
withholding taxes) that may be more suitable for African countries in addressing BEPS. The 
G20 Development Working Group on Domestic Resource Mobilisation for developing 
countries notes that, due to the specific challenges faced by developing countries, the 
Actions that have the greatest impact for developing economies are:  
 
- Action 4:   Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments; 
- Action 6:   Prevent treaty abuse; 
- Action 7:   Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status; 
- Action 10: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation with 
respect to other high-risk transactions; 
- Action 12: Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements; 
- Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation. 
(G20 2014) 
 
Even then, these Action Plans are not necessarily a top priority in all African countries, since 
they are at different levels of economic development and administrative capacity. From the 
response to its questionnaire about priority BEPS concerns of developing countries, the 
above priority concerns are largely the same as those identified by the UN Subcommittee of 
BEPS (UN 2014).  
 
The ATAF Cross-Border Taxation Technical Committee, created in 2014 to define the African 
position on BEPS, holds the view that, the OECD BEPS process notwithstanding, Africa 
must come up with customised solutions to protect its own tax base, to assist African 
countries and groups of countries in similar positions to ensure domestic resource 
mobilisation. This is especially so because Africa is fast becoming the investment destination 
of choice, and its economic growth is set to be even faster over the medium term (ATAF 
2014). In Part 2 of this paper on BEPS in Africa, this author adopts this customised approach 
in discussing three of the BEPS Actions that are of priority to African countries:  
 
- Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments; 
- Action 6: Prevent treaty abuse; 
- Action 7: Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status. 
 
 
13  Concluding remarks 
   
Part 1 of this paper on BEPS in Africa has emphasised that the development of rules for 
global taxation should address the concerns of all countries: all countries must participate 
equally in the formulation of international tax reforms. The rules should be inclusive, to 
ensure they are applied effectively by developed, emerging and developing countries. If the 
reform rules are set by a few countries, this will reinforce a system that exacerbates global 
inequality. International cooperation is required to address BEPS. Countries should not look 
out for their own interests, because this will inadvertently result in double non-taxation.  
 
Since BEPS is a global concern, African countries should associate themselves with the 
OECD recommendations to address BEPS. They have a lot to lose in an ineffective 
international corporate tax system, since a large proportion of their tax revenue is from taxing 
MNEs that have invested in their countries. A strong voice from Africa from both government 
and civil society is needed to comment on BEPS Action items from Africa’s perspective. It is 
important that African countries get together under regional bodies such as ATAF to 
participate in the OECD BEPS project, and use the opportunity to shape the issues in the 15-
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point Action Plan items to address Africa’s concerns. It is also imperative that African 
countries take advantage of initiatives by international organisations such as the UN, OECD 
and G20 to increase capacity in their tax administrations, and to help them build effective tax 
systems so that they can reap the full benefit of international tax reforms. 
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